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The Law Schools and the New Profession of Social Technician
By FREDERICK K.

BEUTEL

considerablediscussion of the
fact that there is emerging all over the world a new profession of management of both private and public business.
These persons neither own the businesswhich they operate
nor win the elections to public office. Nevertheless, they
are increasingly taking over the control of the operation of
our social machinery becauseit is too complicated to be run
by amateurs,whether they be stockholdersor voters.'
In the past much of this technical work of managing complicated social affairs has been done by legally trained personnel, and there are those who still believe that the law
schools have the key for entrance into this new profession.
Others feel that the presentlegal training is wholly besidethe
point and can offer nothing of value toward the development
of this new profession.
It might be worthwhile to examine briefly the qualifications of our American law schools as centers for training the
newly emerging professionof managers,or social technicians.
RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN

What the Law Schools Are Doing Now

our legal education, concerned almost
entirely with court decisions, is doing little more than drill
the students intensively in the technique of trying cases.2
With attention in instruction directed almost entirely toward
prosecution of private litigation, the great body of the curAT THE PRESENT TIME

1
2

Cf. James Burnham, "The ManagerialRevolution," New York, 1941.
Karl N. Llewellyn, "On What Is Wrong with So-called Legal Education," 1935
35 Col. L. Rev., p. 651; Riesman, "Law and Social Science," 1941, 50 Yale L. Jour.,
p. 636.
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riculum is made up of cases decided in the Nineteenth Century in suits between individual businessmen. The field of
public law, insofar as it is studied, is relegated to an examination of judicial veto of government action, based on some
sort of idea that the government operates outside the legal
system. It is significant that there is not a single school in
America devoted exclusively or even to a preponderantdegree to training public lawyers for the practice of law either
as public servants or as specialistsopposing the government.
In fact, law students can and do graduatefrom leading institutions like Harvard Law School without taking a single
course in public law,3 and it should be said that the Harvard
Law School is not much more backward in this respect than
the others, which have copied its curriculum to such a degree
that the field of public law plays a very minor role in the
great majority of schools. This state of the curriculum,
badly out of line with the actual legal as well as the social
condition of the nation where the government now interferes with almost every aspect of life, is simply an historic
accident, basedon the case method. It cannot be corrected,
either for the purposeof training in the art of social control
or even for the simple end of preparingstudents to "practice
law" as we now understand it, by the expedient of adding
another year to the curriculum.4 The difficulty lies in our
theoriesof the nature of law and our method of study.
The Case Method
THE

CASE METHOD,

which is the touchstone of our system,

needs re-examinationeven when used merely as a basis for a
training to enter the narrowerfield of practice of law.
3 See 27 Official Register of Harvard University, The Law School, 1940, No. 29,
p. 22. Criminal law, sometimes classed as a public law course, is required in the first
year for two hours, one semester, ibid., p. 9.
4Merrill, 1939, Handbook of Association of American Law Schools, p. 97; and for
a bibliography on the subject see Association of American Law Schools Program, 1939.
pp. 36, 47-50.
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Our law schools and law curricula have been built up
around "the common law" which is a well-known assumption that law consistsof a rationalizationof the decided cases
of Anglo-American courts. In a primitive society such as
existed in the Early Roman Empire, in Fourteenth Century
England, or in the frontier society of this country in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century where there was little
or no written law, the judges' decision of a case was the best
and almost only evidence upon which one could rely in determining the meaning of law. Therefore, the decided case,
basedon the written opinion, was the source material out of
which the jurist or lawyer could fashion a set of laws for
advising clients and winning future cases. The primitive
condition of legislation and public recordsmade the reported
case about all the evidence there was for one desiringto study
the mechanismof social control by law.
Langdell,late in the Nineteenth Century, re-vitalized this
processand beganwhat we have been pleasedto call the scientific study of cases. But it is an interesting commentary on
the development of culture that as soon as social phenomena
are recognized and named, they have often run their course
of usefulness and are already being replaced by other social
devices. Just as the schools, under the leadershipof Langdell, began to study the cases,society and the legal order embarked upon a tremendous development of legislative and
administrative rules. This was followed shortly afterward
by a complete rewriting of the common law in the form of a
restatement which may supersedethe unwritten law where
it is still pertinent. The power to settle social disputes, the
prevention of future activities against the public order and
the authoritative interpretation of law began to pass from
the judicial to the executive and legislative branches of the
government. About all that remainedto the judicial branch
in the field of adjustment of social interests by government
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action was a veto power that received a staggering blow in
the court-packing fight of 1937.
In view of our present legal theoriesand sanctions, the old
common law methods amount to little more than spreading
superstition and encouraging a technique for settling private controversies,a technique that is often entirely irrelevant to the issues and wholly at odds with the demands of
social justice.5 But the study of cases and the development
of the case method are intriguing operationswhich have been
developed far beyond their usefulness as a method of social
control or as a device for scientific research. The emphasis
on caseshas been so completely overweightedthat one would
have no difficulty in finding honor students of the law and
many teachers in the law faculties who would defend the
ridiculous proposition that "legislation is meaninglesswithout a court decisioninterpreting it."
In fact, the concentrated study of the cases has often
caused us to conceive a "common law" where none ever existed or where it has long since ceasedto have any appreciable
place in the legal order. Even in the field of private law, we
talk, for example, about the common law of negotiable instruments,sales,insurance,or corporations,or even property,
when as a matter of fact in the first-named subject there
never was any common law6 and, in most of the others, the
basic concepts used today are to be found in ancient or
modern statutes and codes.7
Turning to public law, this distortion is even more serious.
In the United States, at least, it is silly to talk about public
common law when it is a well-known fact that our public
5 For a further discussion of this point see, F. K. Beutel, "Some Implications of
Experimental Jurisprudence," 1934, 43 Har. L. Rev., pp. 169, 180 ff.
1 F. K. Beutel, "The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law,"
1938, 51 Har. L. Rev., p. 813; ibid., "The Development of Statutes on Negotiable Paper,"
1940, 40 Col. L. Rev., pp. 836, 865.
7 For some of the older statutory starting points see, James L. Landis, "Statutes and
the Sources of Law," Harvard Legal Essays, 1934, p. 213. The uniform laws and modern
statutes in the subjects named are too well known to require citation.
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law is based directly upon the interpretation and administration of written constitutions and statutes drawn thereunder. The blind following of precedents has caused our
Supreme Court in many cases to wander so far afield from
the written text of the Constitution that it has been forced
by the requirement of popular pressureto reverse its decisions and return again to concepts within the document and
more in accord with social needs.8 But our law schools, to
date, have not yielded. So great has been the over-emphasis
of the case that many of the leaders of the American Bar
Association seem to be convinced that litigation is the only
safe means of adjusting social interests. The now happily
defunct Logan-Walter Bill is a striking commentary on the
extent to which this mistaken idea has gained acceptance not
only among the Bar but even in the Congressof the United
States, where there is a widely-held view that all of the work
of the administrative bodies of the government could be
handled by litigation. Fortunately, the President,who, perhaps, was not so thoroughly grounded in the case method as
were some of the proponentsof the bill, knew better.9
A still more seriousdifficulty with the case method in the
study of law, as a means for developing a sound basisfor scientific social control, is the fact that, even in such simple
matters as keeping the peace, there is no correlationbetween
the point of view of the courts as evidenced in the decision
8 See Mr. Justice Holmes' cryptic dissent on this point, Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U. S. 586, 595, which will be recognized as the basis for a long line of cases reversing
the policy of the court, beginning with National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Charles C. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S.
548; and for examples of others see, United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S. Ct. 451
(1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S.
525 (1923); and see the reversal of the application of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's dictum as often phrased, "The power to tax is the power to destroy," McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 431 (1819); in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134
(1937); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S.
466 (1939); O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939); but cf. Pittman v. Home
Owners Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21 (1939).
Any student of constitutional law can suggest many others.
9 27 Am. Bar Assn. Jour., 1941, p. 52.
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of cases and the necessaryrequirementsfor social regulation.
As indicated elsewhere,'0the courts deal only with aggravated cases of social maladjustmentwhere the law has failed
properly to balance the conflicting interests of the parties.
The cases are all decided ex post facto and long after the
results of the maladjustmenthave run their course. Using
the case as a method for finding law that can act as a form of
social regulation is, therefore, not only subject to the fallacy
of arguing from the particularto the general,but also to the
glaring defect that, since proper adjustment of interests
would eliminate litigation, the method by which the litigation is settled usually offersno clues to the prevention of litigation in future cases."
Every field of law is full of illustrationsof how the accidental decision of a case has become the beginning of a long
line of authority which created a rule of law wholly out of
line with social conditions, and totally unable to offer any
solution of similar problems in a changing society.'2 It is
small wonder that a search for certainty in a field of legal
thought based so completely on the accidental presence of
cases in courts of law has led to the school of gastronomical
jurisprudence,which would solve the problemsof social adjustment by examiningthe judge'sbreakfastbefore he goes on
the bench. Still this approach is no more ridiculous in our
present state of legal development than is the processof de10 See supra, note 5.
11 For example, the problem of traffic accidents has been best solved by stop light,
by-passes, traffic circles, and express highways; the industrial accident cases by safety
devices and workman's compensation; criminal cases may be reduced by play grounds,
recreation, and the like; illegal sale of liquor by state stores, see Shipman, "State Administrative Machinery for Liquor Control," 1940, Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 600,
611 ff. In these and many other similar instances, generalizations from court decisions
could offer no clue to the successful solution.
12 For example: the fellow servant rule; Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (1704), holding
promissory notes non-negotiable, in negotiable paper; the doctrine of Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Broc. Fed Cases, No. 8411 (1811) that suits for actions of trespass to real estate
are local actions, American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws 614, and for
the manner in which the weight of precedent prevails over common sense in such matters
see, 7 Proceedings of the American Law Institute, 1929, pp. 86-9. Any teacher of law
can add numerous other examples from his own courses.
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rivingstandards
of socialcontrolfromisolatedlitigatedcases,
a processthatnowformsthebasisfor coursesof studyin our
leadinglawschools.
Judicial Philosophy as a Basis of Social Control
EVEN W SOMECERTAINTY
could be established by the elimi-

nation of the isolated case and a substitution of statistical
study of court decisions,which is not the basisof the present
case method technique, judicial philosophy is a bad foundation for a legal system, or for a course of instruction in the
administration of social justice. The roots of the judges'
social philosophy lie in isolation, class consciousness,conservatism, and even reaction.'3 The best the judge can offer in
the way of social philosophy is usually the material that he
studied when he was in school, which was nearly thirty years
prior to the time of the judicial decision he is rendering.
'Whenthe case in turn becomes the basisof the legal philosophy of the succeeding generationof courts and lawyers, legal
thinking tends to move in a closing spiral,turning constantly
in on itself in an orbit entirely out of touch with society and
social needs." With our rules of evidence and our court pro13 The idea that the courts are the bulwarks of liberty and the defenders of the
common man has been neatly exploded by Edgerton, "The Incidence of Judicial Control
over Congress,"1937, 22 Cor. L. Q., p. 299.
14 Even so liberal-mindeda judge as Mr. Justice Holmes was not free from this type
of thinking. See the horse and buggy standard for negligence of a driver of a truck, in
the face of a verdict, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Goodman, 275 U. S.
66, 70 (1927). In spite of the fact that the decision of Mr. Justice Holmes, supra, was
so out of line with social conditions that it excited a storm of protest and law review
comment (see Index to Legal Periodicals,Jan. 1926-Sept. 1928, p. 667), mostly unfavorable, a glance at Shepard'sCitations will show that this dictum became the basis of one
SupremeCourt decision and thirty-three decisionsin the Circuit Courts of Appeal, either
denying the injured plaintiff the right to go to the jury or depriving him of a verdict
after the lower court had allowed the case to go to the jury. These lower court decisions
not only following but extending the stop, look, and listen doctrine make interesting
reading to one who would like to see "what a dd fool a man has to make himself in
order to conform to the decisions of the Supreme Court," 22 Ill. L. Rev., pp. 800-1.
They are only a part of the many hundreds of other cases which have extended this
foolish dictum all through the lower federal and state courts to refuse recovery in daily
accidents to an injured plaintiff under facts where a sound social policy would cover the
whole matter with insurance. It should be noted, however, that this outrageous doctrine only lasted seven years, when it was abolishedby Mr. Justice Cardozo, one of our
most socially-alert judges (in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 98, pp. 104-6).
If time and space permitted, similar anachronismscould be produced at random from
any field of law which are still flourishing.
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cedure such as they are, the judge tends more and more to
operatein the rarefiedatmosphereof a system carefully insulated from social control. It is small wonder, then, that a
large number of the social changes that were ordered by
statutes or regulations (we avoid, to limit controversy, indicating whether we think they are progressiveor decadent)
were declaredunconstitutional when they were challengedin
the courts during the last century because they were found
by the judges to be "'unprecedented."'5
When the judicial decision becomes the basis of the study
of law, as it has been in America during the last thirty years,
it is not surprisingthat legal processesare of so little use in
solving social problems. The continued study of law on this
basiscannot meet the requirementsof the new age of changing legal activity which is now upon us and will come even
faster in the cleaning up of the debrisof the present war. It
is necessaryto begin now, while our schools are being decimated to provide manpower for the military machine, to lay
the foundation of courseswhich will offer scientific guidance
to those who will return to pick up the loose ends of our shattered social system when peace finally comes.
Whether the law schools enter whole-heartedly into the
task of developing their graduatesto fill all the various requirements of the new profession of technicians in social
15 For example, see Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' conclusion in Schechter Corp. et al.
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 541 (1935); and note how the expert commission, partly
because it is new, cannot be constitutionally entrusted with finding the fact of value in
rate cases, see Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); but a common law jury, largely
because it is old, is held entirely competent to pass upon such technical facts, United Gas
See also Brown, "Due
Public Service Co. v. State of Texas, 303 U. S. 123 (1938).
Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court," 1927, 40 Har. L. Rev., p. 943,
where the author points out that between 1921 and 1927 31 percent of all the decisions
in Due Process cases were against the constitutionality of statutes. It should be noted
that this was at a time when the governments of the country were, on the whole, in the
hands of the conservatives. A similar percentage would undoubtedly appear from 19271937 when the liberals were in power. It may also be coincidence that the increase in
the percentage of cases declared unconstitutional corresponds with the appearance in the
courts of lawyers trained by the case method. The more liberal attitude during the last
five years is accounted for by the systematic effort of the Federal administration to place
the few progressively-minded lawyers available in judicial positions.
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control, or merely continue to train a decreasingsegment of
this profession, they must re-examine the basic legal postulates and the method whereby we seek them.
The Sources of Basic Legal Postulates

for determining legal postulates?
If the casesand the traditional common law methods will not
suffice as the foundation on which to build even an adequate
system of "legal education," where are the law schools to
turn for the basic information necessary to provide sound
training for their students, either as "lawyers" or social
technicians?
History has offered many starting points for legal systems.
Among these have been the will of the conqueror, the arbitrary edicts of dictators, the mysticism of divine will with its
closely related source, the canons of the priesthood, and the
desires of a ruling class. One needs only casual familiarity
with legal history to see that the failure of these sources to
provide any adequate system of social regulation has been
demonstratedbeyond doubt. In addition to the dicta of the
judiciary, which has already been disposed of as a proper
source of law and postulates of social justice, there remain
only three other sources which have been recognized in the
past. These are received ideas of law which are held by the
professionaladministratorsof the law itself, namely the bar;
the writings of legal scholars, who are always closely connected with the bar and the courts; and lastly the democratic
will of the people as expressedby popular legislation.
Recent experience with legislation and ideas of justice
recommended by the American Bar Association has demonstrated that, in this country at least, where the members of
the bar are a group of entrepreneursderiving their livelihood
and profit almost wholly from money fees, and relying as
they do upon the favor of the courts for their prosperity, the
WHAT,

THEN, IS THE BASIS
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professional lawyers are unable to look at the problems of
social adjustment with that clear, unbiased, detached point
of view necessary for the formulation of any practicable
system of social justice.
Although the leading legal writers in the past have offered
many suggestionsfor improvement in the machinery of justice, they have unfortunately been so saturated with the
common law technique and have become so blinded by the
processof collecting and tabulating casesthat they lack both
the social information and the perspective successfully to
project a well-roundedlegal system which could hope to deal
with the complicated problem of achieving social justice.
This brings us to the last historical source of legal axioms
which at one time or another in the history of the world has
been regardedas the basis for ultimate solution of the problem, the will of the Demos or the systematizedexpressionof
their will by elected representativesin the form of statutes
and codes. Although it may be bad politics at a time when
we have an interest in a bloody conflict in its allegeddefense,
careful scientific method requires the questioning of the
democratic will as a basis for a successful legal system. Assuming the democratic standard,that law and social control
should achieve the good of the greatest number, there has
been a belief that the people somehow, by collective action,
could devise the basis upon which a system to achieve this
good could be built. The idea is, of course, founded upon
two propositions. The first is the Eighteenth Century belief in enlightened selfishness;that is, that the common man
in satisfying his wants will demand those things which work
for his own good in the long run and that the sum of individual good would add up to the greatest collective good.
The second is the Jeffersoniandictum, "The people are always
right in the end; they may make mistakes, but they themselves rectify them."
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selfishness
attainingthe collective
Theideaof enlightened
upona simplesocietywhereeachpergoodwaspredicated
the resultsof his actionsboth
soncouldseeandunderstand
upon himselfand society. Althoughthis may have been
the casein the timeof JohnStuartMill,it is no longerposof the modernsocialstrucsibletoday. The complication
canpassintelligentjudgtureissuchthatnosingleindividual
menton the resultof his actionsuponhimselfor uponthe
is accustomed
to takeexwholeof society. Theindividual
simplematterspertainingto
pert adviceon comparatively
health,repairof machinery,investment,constructionof
houses,education,andthe like. Why,then,shouldhe exin themostcomplicated
pectto be ableto knowtheanswers
theregulation
of society? Thefateof France
of allactivities,
is thebestillustration
of the workingof the doctrineof enin the TwentiethCentury.
lightenedselfishness
is that the collectivepopulaceare
Thesecondassumption
to reachthetruthaboutpublicaffairs. This
able,somehow,
is alsoout of linewiththe factsof modernsociety.
didnot havethe benefitof modJefferson
Unfortunately
ern psychologywhichshowsthat morethan40 percentof
the peoplelack sufficientintelligenceto get throughan
ordinarycoursein highschool. Of the remaining60 percent who perhapscan completetheirsecondaryeducation,
lessthanone-thirdhavethe abilityto do collegework,and
onlyone-thirdof thesecollegestudentscan takeup professionalstudy,whereabout50percentfailbeforegraduation.16
Puttingit anotherway,aboutonein five can evenhopeto
capacity
go to college,andlessthanonein tenhavesufficient
of theproblems
of governpossiblyto grasptheramifications
16 See Garrett and Schneck, "PsychologicalTests, Methods and Results," 1933, Part II,
pp. 26-39, where the author correlates the Stanford-Binet tests with the results of the
Army Alpha and many other studies. The Army Alpha showed that less than 5 percent
of the population has the capacity for work on a high professionallevel. See also Bell,
"Youth Tell Their Story," 1938, pp. 51, 96; and Terman, "The Intelligence of School
Children," 1919, p. 89.
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ing a country such as ours.'7 In the light of these facts, it
is pure nonsenseto expect that any democratic will made up
of the majority of feeling, votes, or approved ideas or ideals
of an entire unselected population could possibly offer a
working basisfor regulating and adjustingthe myriad clashes
of interestswhich occur in a society complicated beyond the
most prophetic dreams of Jefferson, Lincoln, or their associates. The common man in modern society is scarcely caable of determiningwhat are his own interests and of taking
intelligent steps to protect them, to say nothing of solving
the problems of social adjustment for nations made up of
millions of individuals with their myriad wants, ambitions,
desires, and expectations. It is pure mysticism to believe
that the collective judgment of a group who cannot individually understand the problem at hand can offer any real
basisfor its solution.
If any working system of social control in modern society
is to grow out of the democratic principle of the greatest
good for the greatestnumber, it must be predicatedupon the
scientific study by experts, drawn from the upper 10 percent
of the intelligencelevel of the population. The work of this
group should be to determine,first, the needs of the people in
17 It is interesting to note that our high schools have already enrolled the capacity
of the youth able, according to these figures, to do their work; 54 percent of the popula-

tion of high school age were enrolled in 1930 and about 67 percent in 1936, "Statistical
Abstracts of the United States," Government Printing Office, Washington, 1939, p. 108.
In like manner the colleges are reaching their capacity with over 924,000 enrolled in
1930, 1,000,000 in 1936 and 1,200,000 in 1939, ibid., p. 110, p. 117, and "World
Almanac," World-Telegram, New York, 1941, p. 551. This number constituted a little
more than 10 percent of the people of college age in America, "Fifteenth Census of
United States," Part II, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933, p. 576. The
census figures of 1930 show about 21.4 percent of people between 18 and 20 years old
were in school, ibid., p. 1091, while much less than one-fifth of those between 16 and
24 years were in school. Of those who finish high school less than 300 in 1000 have
the ability to go to college while only 105 out of 1000 with such ability have actually
matriculated, Bell, op. cit., p. 96. This means that our colleges and professional schools
are failing to reach over half of the population with the mental ability to do their work,
while they are taking in large numbers who are financially able but without the mental
capacity to handle college training. It is small wonder then, that less than half of those
who undertake this work ever receive their final degrees, "Statistical Abstract," op. cit.,
p. 110. This appalling waste of our greatest natural resource, native intelligence, is a
problem for government administrators and all educators, legal and otherwise.
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society, and second, the means of creating effectively legal
machinery which will make possiblethe satisfaction of those
needs. What the common man cannot do for himself must
be done by scientists acting as his servants, otherwise democracy will become either blind groping in the dark or a shibboleth used to drive the common men to do the will and serve
the purposes of others under the guise that he is somehow
helping himself. This seems to be the state in which most
of our social systems now find themselvesafter long experiments with government by popular vote. (It should not
be forgotten that Hitler came to power in Germany by using
democratic forms.)
Of course, there is always the possibility that we may have
accidentally hit upon a legal system adequate to our social
needs, without any guiding philosophy. It is interesting to
note, in this respect, that the civilization in which our founding fathers lived and from which they rationalizedin creating our present legal system, was much closer to the year 1
A.D. in all of its attributes than our present civilization is to
theirs.'8 The industrial revolution and all of the inventions
which have abolishedday and night, distanceand time, which
have changed the face of the earth as to make it possiblefor
thousandsof men to live in comparative comfort where before a few could exist in the most primitive squalor, have
made our systemsof law and government as antiquateda tool
for social control as the stage coach as a means of transportation.

Just as it was impossiblefor the founding fathers to foresee the strain which would be put upon their governmental
system, so also we are likely to find that old rules of law, except insofar as we can show scientifically that they can serve
their purposes in their new surroundings, are useless for
18 Robert S. Lynd, "Middletown-A Study in Contemporary American Culture,"
New York, 1929.
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guidance in solving our modern problems. The doctrine of
Stare Decisis and the laws of the Medes and Persianswhich
changeth not cannot be long expected to regulate a society
so dynamic that the latest airplaneis antiquatedbefore it can
be taken off the assemblyline. We must admit that juridical
theoriesof the social and legal structure, no matter how perfect they may appearin the light of logic or on the basis of
legal theory, are wholly uselessunless they can solve successfully the simplest of all legal problems; namely, keeping the
peace at home and abroad. Even our most widely heralded
legal devices have failed to meet this most elementary test,
to say nothing of the larger problem now being posed: the
duty, somehow, of seeing that every man gets an economic
squaredeal.
The new age of activity which is now upon us will demand
a new type of legal-social craftsman who can rebuild the
legal structure to meet the needs of today and tomorrow
through a process of orderly change which will preserve to
society and the deserving people in it the technical gains of
the last century. This is the most gigantic task yet to challenge the intelligence of man. The penalty of failure will
be to turn our modern mechanical power, chemistry, bacteriology, and all of the materialof science over to a governmental intelligence which has learnedlittle since the days of
Rome. In the hands of such a government we may expect
modern technology not only to wreck the social order, but
eventually to destroy itself.
A New Social Science as a Basis for Legal Postulates
As HAS BEEN INDICATED elsewhere,19there is rapidly emerging on all sides evidence that there are now available sufficient

facts upon which there can be built a new science of human
conduct comparablewith the physicalsciencesboth in the ac19 See supra,

note

8.
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curacy of its data and in predictability of future happenings
when applied to the mass actions of men. Scientific laws of
human behavior, and the ability to apply them in devising
man-made laws for the control of society, are now becoming
a dominating force in the world. No thinking person can
view the riseof the Third Reich or the developmentsin Soviet
Russia without realizing that they are awesome examples of
the use that can be made of such new social sciencesto rebuild
society on lines never before conceived. The men who
wield these new forces, directing them to such purposes as
they will, have been able to make the whole world tremble.
Under the impact of intelligently, or fiendishlyif you will,
directed social planning, laissez faire is dead in the economic
world and rapidly disappearing in the political and legal
spheres. Pressuregroups, economic cartels, propaganda,and
outright gang methods directed toward scientifically predictable ends are at large both at home and abroad. We have
witnessed nation after nation torn asunder by these forces
directed from within or without by men who understood
their use and who have turned them to their ends. We may
even now be in the process of seeing our own civilization
destroyed, our own people becoming the slaves of foreign
purposes, and perhaps being led to their own destruction
through the unbridled operation of skillful economic blocs,
propagandists,and pressuregroups.
The American public administratorof today and tomorrow must understand the use of these forces and be able to
devise laws to control them in the interest of what we are
now pleasedto call the democratic good.
One illustration will suffice to show the myriad problems
which must be solved. In the most sacredfield of the bill of
rights, freedom of expression and action it may not be sufficient to keep the avenues of expressionand trade open to
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all, or even to attempt to see that all views have an equal
opportunity for exposition or all intellectual wares be accorded an open market. Perhaps there will have to be an
intelligent evaluationof the power of ideaswhich are at large
in society, in a manner similar to that in which we now
evaluate food products. It may be that poison ideasare more
dangerous than poison foods if placed in the minds of the
wrong people. It seems as possibleto make experimentson
what 'goods' should be offered in the intellectual market as
it is to determine what should become availablefor the sustenance of the "inner man." Freedom of speech, thought
and activity may have wholly disappearedin large parts of
the world, becausesome of the population cannot stand the
impact of certain ideas. If nervous breakdownscan be induced in men and animalsby the overcomplicationof life,20
why cannot social breakdownsbe produced by over-complication of ideas? Is not this the principle upon which the
dictatorshave operatedto destroy the moraleof enemy countries? May it not be that freedom of expression, thought,
and action is the birthright only of the intelligent few, and
is it not possible that we have at hand the means of determining who these few are, and how this principle can be
applied to even "democratic"government?
The government administrator,or technician, who devises
the social and legal rules for the state of tomorrow can hardly
escape the task of finding answersfor these and many more
complicated problems. To assume that we now know the
answersis to act on blind prejudiceand in the face of obvious
evidence to the contrary which appearson all sides.
Governments of the future, whether they be despotisms
or democracies,can no longer rely solely upon the will of
20 Hilgard and Marquis, "Conditioning and Learning," 1940, pp. 280-287;
Cook, "A
Survey of Methods Used to Produce Experimental Neurosis," 95 Am. J. Psychiat., pp.
1259-76; Maier, "Studies of Abnormal Behavior in the Rat," 1939. Also see "Grewsome Tales for Children," Time (Feb. 17, 1941), p. 39; "Propaganda Study Used Successfully by 3,000 Schools," N. Y. Times (Feb. 21, 1941), p. 1.
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individuals or of the demos to determine the course of their
actions. If they are to succeed in regulating society for
whatever ends the policy of the government dictates, their
actions, decreesor laws must be promulgatedonly after careful study of the problems involved, and the social reactions
which are likely to occur upon the enforcement of the projected regulation or action. The observationof social reactions, and the prediction of the results to follow upon a projected course of action, requiresexpert researchby carefully
organized departmentswhich are now appearingin all types
of governments. As the technique of observationand prediction develops, there will necessarily follow a narrowing
of the field of what we now call policy determination; because it is obviously bad policy to attempt the impossible.
This ever-widening demand for governmental technicians is
likely, in the long run, to develop into government by experts
both in the fields of observation and in policy making.
Under the circumstancesit is not a far cry to the day when
the postulates of the law will rest equally upon the observation of a real, experimental social science developed under
the guidance of experts.
The Necessity for Action

in the
past, has belonged almost wholly to the lawyers, who, unfortunately, have used almost every device other than scientific
method to solve the problems involved; but even so they
have been forced by the very nature of their work to go further in the field than any other profession. It is no credit to
the law schools that most of the progresshas been achieved
by groping in the dark.
Either the law schools must revise their program to meet
the requirementsof the field of activity which their graduates have preempted,or other schoolsmust be created to train
THIS FIELD OF HIGHLY PROFESSIONALIZED ACTIVITY,
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the skilled government technicians of the future. The fact
that we are late in starting simply intensifies our doubleheadedproject, to create either within or outside of the law
schools a new unified social science, and devise a means of
using it as an instrument of social control through government and law. Since the law schools will be forced by the
new requirementseven of litigious practice to develop a large
part of this field, they ought to undertake the entire task in
cooperationwith other departmentsof the educationalinstitutions. If the law schools are too blind, too conservative,
too stupid, or too lazy to undertake the task, it should be
started at once by independentinstitutions.

